An Essay on the Evils of Popular IgnoranceFoster, John
Philosophy
An Essay on the Evils of Popular Ignorance
Foster, John
Education; Great Britain -- Social conditions -- 19th century; Literacy; Missions -- India; Religious education
To conclude this part of the melancholy statement; it may be observed of
the class in question, that they have but very little notion of guilt, or
possible guilt, in anything but external practice. That busy interior
existence, which is the moral person, genuine and complete; the thoughts,
imaginations, volitions; the motives, projects, deliberations, devices,
the indulgence of the ideas of what they cannot or dare not practically
realize,--all this, we have reason to believe, passes nearly exempted from
jurisdiction, even of that feeble and undecisive kind which _may_
occasionally attempt an interference with their actions. They do indeed
take such notice of the quality of these things within, as to be aware
that some of them are not to be disclosed in their communications; which
prudential caution has of course little to do with conscience, when the
things so withheld are internally cherished in perfect disregard of the
Omniscient Observer, and with hardly the faintest monition that the
essence of the guilt is the same, with only a difference in degree, in
intending or deliberately desiring an evil, and in acting it.
It is not natural obtuseness of mental faculty that we are attributing,
all this while, to the uneducated class of our people, in thus exposing
the defectiveness of their discernment between right and wrong. If it
were, there might arise somewhat of the consolation afforded in
contemplating some of the very lowest of the savage tribes of mankind, by
the idea that such outcasts of the rational nature must stand very nearly
exempt from accountableness, through absolute natural want of mind. But in
the barbarians of our country we shall often observe a very competent, and
now and then an abundant, share of native sense. We may see it evinced in
respect to the very questions of morality, in cases where they are quite
compelled, as will occasionally happen, to feel themselves brought within
the cognizance of one or other of its plainest rules. In such cases we
have witnessed a sharpness and activity of intellect claiming almost our
admiration. What contrivance of deception and artful evasion. What
dexterity of quibble, and captious objection, and petty sophistry. What
vigilance to observe how the plea in justification or excuse takes effect,
and, if they perceive it does not succeed, what address in sliding into a
different one. What quickness to avail themselves of any mistake, or
apparent concession, in the examiner or reprover. What copious rhetoric in
exaggeration of the cause which tempted to do wrong, or of the great good
hoped to be effected by the little deviation from the right,--a good
surely enough to excuse so trifling an impropriety. What facility of
placing between themselves and the censure, the recollected example of
some good man who has been "overtaken in a fault."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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