=60.= The aim of Riemann's dissertation, as we saw in Chapter I., was to define space as a species of manifold, _i.e._ as a particular kind of collection of magnitudes. It was thus assumed, to begin with, that spatial figures could be regarded as magnitudes, and the axioms which emerged, accordingly, determined only the particular place of these among the many algebraically possible varieties of magnitudes. The resulting formulation of the axioms--while, from the mathematical standpoint of metrical Geometry, it was almost wholly laudable--must, from the standpoint of philosophy, be regarded, in my opinion, as a _petitio principii_. For when we have arrived at regarding spatial figures as magnitudes, we have already traversed the most difficult part of the ground. The axioms of metrical Geometry--and it is metrical Geometry, exclusively, which is considered in Riemann's Essay--will appear, in Chapter III., to be divisible into two classes. Of these, the first class--which contains the axioms common to Euclid and Metageometry, the only axioms seriously discussed by Riemann--are not the results of measurement, nor of any conception of magnitude, but are conditions to be fulfilled before measurement becomes possible. The second class only--those which express the difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces--can be deduced as results of measurement or of conceptions of magnitude. As regards the first class, on the contrary, we shall see that the relativity of position--by which space is distinguished from all other known manifolds, except time--leads logically to the necessity of three of the most distinctive axioms of Geometry, and yet this relativity cannot be called a deduction from conceptions of magnitude. In analytical Geometry, owing to the fact that coordinate systems start from points, and hence build up lines and surfaces, it is easy to suppose that points can be given independently of lines and of each other, and thus the relativity of position is lost sight of. The error thus suggested by mathematics was probably reinforced by Herbart's theory of space, which, by its serial character, as we have seen, appeared to him to facilitate a construction out of successive points, and to which Riemann acknowledges his indebtedness both in his Dissertation and elsewhere. The same error reappears in Helmholtz, in whom it is probably due wholly to the methods of analytical Geometry. It is a striking fact that, throughout the writings of these two men, there is not, so far as I know, one allusion to the relativity of position, that property of space from which, as our next chapter will shew, the richest quarry of consequences can be extracted. This is not a result of any conception of magnitude, but follows from the nature of our space-intuition; yet no one, surely, could call it empirical, since it is bound up in the very possibility of locating things _there_ as opposed to _here_.