[Footnote 93: Perhaps it may be said (and such, it has already been seen, is the opinion of Coke and others) that the chapter of Magna Carta, that "no _bailiff_ from henceforth shall put any man to his open law, (put him on trial,) nor to an oath (that is, an oath of self-exculpation) upon his (the bailiff's) own accusation or testimony, without credible witnesses brought in to prove the charge," _is itself_ a "provision in regard to the king's justices sitting in criminal trials," and therefore implies that _they are to sit_ in such trials. But, although the word _bailiff_ includes all _judicial_, as well as other, officers, and would therefore in this case apply to the king's justices, if they were to sit in criminal trials; yet this particular chapter of Magna Carta evidently does not contemplate "_bailiffs_" while acting in their _judicial_ capacity, (for they were not allowed to sit in criminal trials at all,) but only in the character of _witnesses_; and that the meaning of the chapter is, that the simple testimony (simplici loquela) of "no bailiff," (of whatever kind,) unsupported by other and "credible witnesses," shall be sufficient to put any man on trial, or to his oath of self-exculpation.[98] It will be noticed that the words of this chapter are _not_, "no bailiff _of ours_,"--that is, _of the king_,--as in some other chapters of Magna Carta; but simply "no bailiff," &c. The prohibition, therefore, applies to all "bailiffs,"--to those chosen by the people, as well as those appointed by the king. And the prohibition is obviously founded upon the idea (a very sound one in that age certainly, and probably also in this) that public officers (whether appointed by king or people) have generally, or at least frequently, too many interests and animosities against accused persons, to make it safe to convict any man on their testimony alone.