The idea of Coke and others, that the object of this chapter was simply to forbid _magistrates_ to put a man on trial, when there were no witnesses against him, but only the simple accusation or testimony of the magistrates themselves, before whom he was to be tried, is preposterous; for that would be equivalent to supposing that magistrates acted in the triple character of judge, jury and witnesses, _in the same trial_; and that, therefore, _in such cases_, they needed to be prohibited from condemning a man on their own accusation or testimony alone. But such a provision would have been unnecessary and senseless, for two reasons; first, because the bailiffs or magistrates had no power to "hold pleas of the crown," still less to try or condemn a man; that power resting wholly with the juries; second, because if bailiffs or magistrates could try and condemn a man, without a jury, the prohibition upon their doing so upon their own accusation or testimony alone, would give no additional protection to the accused, so long as these same bailiffs or magistrates were allowed to decide what weight should be given, _both to their own testimony and that of other witnesses_; for, if they wished to convict, they would of course decide that any testimony, however frivolous or irrelevant, _in addition to their own_, was sufficient. Certainly a magistrate could always procure witnesses enough to testify to something or other, which _he himself_ could decide to be corroborative of his own testimony. And thus the prohibition would be defeated in fact, though observed in form.] [Footnote 94: In this chapter I have called the justices "_presiding_ officers," solely for the want of a better term. They are not "_presiding_ officers," in the sense of having any authority over the jury; but are only assistants to, and teachers and servants of, the jury. The foreman of the jury is properly the "presiding officer," so far as there is such an officer at all. The sheriff has no authority except over other persons than the jury.] [Footnote 95: In this extract, Palgrave seems to assume that the king himself had a right to sit as judge, in _jury_ trials, in the _county_ courts, in both civil and criminal cases. I apprehend he had no such power at the _common law_, but only to sit in the trial of appeals, and in the trial of peers, and of civil suits in which peers were parties, and possibly in the courts of ancient demesne.] [Footnote 96: _Alderman_ was a title anciently given to various _judicial_ officers, as the Alderman of all England, Alderman of the King, Alderman of the County, Alderman of the City or Borough, Alderman of the Hundred or Wapentake. These were all _judicial_ officers. See Law Dictionaries.]