Mr. Hallam evidently thinks there is no use for a jury, except where there is a "_trial_"--meaning thereby a contest on matters of _fact_. His language is, that "there are many legal procedures, besides _trial_ by jury, through which a party's goods or person may be taken." Now Magna Carta says nothing of _trial_ by jury; but only of the _judgment_, or sentence, of a jury. It is only _by inference_ that we come to the conclusion that there must be a _trial_ by jury. Since the jury alone can give the _judgment_, or _sentence_, we _infer_ that they must _try_ the case; because otherwise they would be incompetent, and would have no moral right, to give _judgment_. They must, therefore, examine the grounds, (both of law and fact,) or rather _try_ the grounds, of every action whatsoever, whether it be decided on "default, demurrer," or otherwise, and render their judgment, or sentence, thereon, before any judgment can be a legal one, on which "to take a party's goods or person." In short, the principle of Magna Carta is, that no judgment can be valid _against a party's goods or person_, (not even a judgment for costs,) except a judgment rendered by a jury. Of course a jury must try every question, both of law and fact, that is involved in the rendering of that judgment. They are to have the assistance and advice of the judges, so far as they desire them; but the judgment itself must be theirs, and not the judgment of the court. As to "process of attachment for contempt," it is of course lawful for a judge, in his character of a peace officer, to issue a warrant for the arrest of a man guilty of a contempt, as he would for the arrest of any other offender, and hold him to bail, (or, in default of bail, commit him to prison,) to answer for his offence before a jury. Or he may order him into custody without a warrant when the offence is committed in the judge's presence. But there is no reason why a judge should have the power of _punishing_ for contempt, any more than for any other offence. And it is one of the most dangerous powers a judge can have, because it gives him absolute authority in a court of justice, and enables him to tyrannize as he pleases over parties, counsel, witnesses, and jurors. If a judge have power to punish for contempt, and to determine for himself what is a contempt, the whole administration of justice (or injustice, if he choose to make it so) is in his hands. And all the rights of jurors, witnesses, counsel, and parties, are held subject to his pleasure, and can be exercised only agreeably to his will. He can of course control the entire proceedings in, and consequently the decision of, every cause, by restraining and punishing every one, whether party, counsel, witness, or juror, who presumes to offer anything contrary to his pleasure.