93 Such a one might by touch attain to have IDEAS of UPPER and LOWER 94 Which modes of situation he would attribute only to things tangible 95 He would not at first sight think anything he saw, high or low, erect or inverted 96 This illustrated by an example 97 By what means he would come to denominate visible OBJECTS, high or low, etc. 98 Why he should think those OBJECTS highest, which are painted on the lowest part of his eye, and VICE VERSA 99 How he would perceive by sight, the situation of external objects 100 Our propension to think the contrary, no argument against what has been said 101 Objection 102 Answer 103 An object could not be known at first sight by the colour 104 Nor by the magnitude thereof 105 Nor by the figure 106 In the first act of vision, no tangible thing would be suggested by sight 107 Difficulty proposed concerning number 108 Number of things visible, would not at first sight suggest the like number of things tangible 109 Number the creature of the mind 110 One born blind would not at first sight number visible things as others do 111 The situation of any object determined with respect only to objects of the same sense 112 No distance, great or small, between a visible and tangible thing 113 The not observing this, cause of difficulty in erect vision 114 Which otherwise includes nothing unaccountable 115 What is meant by the picture being inverted 116 Cause of mistake in this matter 117 Images in the eye, not pictures of external objects 118 In what sense they are pictures 119 In this affair we must carefully distinguish between ideas of sight and touch 120 Difficult to explain by words the true Theory of Vision 121 The question, whether there is any IDEA common to sight and touch, stated 122 Abstract extension inquired into 123 It is incomprehensible 124 Abstract extension not the OBJECT of geometry 125 The general IDEA of a triangle, considered 126 Vacuum, or pure space, not common to sight and touch 127 There is no idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses 128 First argument in proof hereof 129 Second argument 130 Visible figure and extension, not distinct IDEAS from colour 131 Third argument 132 Confirmation drawn from Mr. Molyneux's problem of a sphere and a cube, published by Mr. Locke 133 Which is falsely solved, if the common supposition be true 134 More might be said in proof of our tenet, but this suffices 135 Further reflection on the foregoing problem 136 The same thing doth not affect both sight and touch 137 The same idea of motion not common to sight and touch 138 The way wherein we apprehend motion by sight, easily collected from what hath been said 139 QU.