An Essay Towards a New Theory of VisionBerkeley, George
Philosophy
An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision
Berkeley, George
Vision -- Early works to 1800
Now, as these customary,
experimental means of suggesting distance do likewise suggest magnitude,
so they suggest the one as immediately as the other. I say they do not
(VIDE sect. 53) first suggest distance, and then leave the mind from
thence to infer or compute magnitude, jut suggest magnitude as
immediately and directly as they suggest distance.
78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear instance of the
insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the way wherein the mind
perceives and estimates the magnitude of outward objects. There is
nevertheless a use of computation by them in order to determine the
apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a connexion with, and
are proportional to, those other ideas or perceptions which are the true
and immediate occasions that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude
of things. But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning
mathematical computation in optics: that it can never be very precise and
exact since the judgments we make of the magnitude of external things do
often depend on several circumstances, which are not proportionable to,
or capable of being defined by, lines and angles.
79. From what has been said we may safely deduce this consequence; to
wit, that a man born blind and made to see would, at first opening of his
eyes, make a very different judgment of the magnitude of objects
intromitted by them from what others do. He would not consider the ideas
of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion with, the ideas of
touch: his view of them being entirely terminated within themselves, he
can no otherwise judge them great or small than as they contain a greater
or lesser number of visible points. Now, it being certain that any
visible point can cover or exclude from view only one other visible
point, it follows that whatever object intercepts the view of another
hath an equal number of visible points with it; and consequently they
shall both be thought by him to have the same magnitude. Hence it is
evident one in those circumstances would judge his thumb, with which he
might hide a tower or hinder its being seen, equal to that tower, or his
hand, the interposition whereof might conceal experimental means the
firmament from his view, equal to the firmament: how great an inequality
soever there may in our apprehensions seem to be betwixt those two
things, because of the customary and close connexion that has grown up in
our minds between the objects of sight and touch; whereby the very
different and distinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and
confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the same thing; out of
which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves.
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