An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will — John Shaqi
An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the WillBledsoe, Albert Taylor
Philosophy
An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will
Bledsoe, Albert Taylor
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
This is not all. Edwards undertakes to point out the difference between
natural and moral necessity. In the case of moral necessity, says he,
"the cause with which the effect is connected is of a particular kind:
viz., that which is of a moral nature; either some previous habitual
disposition, or some motive presented to the understanding. And the
effect is also of a particular kind, being likewise of a moral nature;
consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul, or voluntary
action." But the difference, says he, "does not lie so much _in the
nature of the connection_, as in the two terms connected." Now, let us
suppose that any effect, the creation of the world, for example, is
produced by the power of God. In this case, the connection between the
effect produced, the creation of the world, and the act of the divine
omnipotence by which it is created, is certainly the connection between
an effect and its efficient cause. The two terms are here connected by a
natural necessity. But we are most explicitly informed, that the
connection between motives and volitions, differs from this in the
nature of the two terms connected, rather than in the nature of the
connection. How could language more clearly or precisely convey the
meaning of an author? To say that President Edwards does not make motive
the efficient cause of volition, is, indeed, not so much to interpret,
as it is to new model, his philosophy of the will.
The connection between the strongest motive, he declares, and the
corresponding volition, is "absolute," just as absolute as any
connection in the world. If the strongest motive exists, the volition is
sure to follow; it necessarily follows; it is _absurd_ to suppose, that
it may attend its cause or not. To say that it may follow the influence
of its cause, or may not, is to say that it is not dependent on that
influence, that it is not the effect of it. In other words, it is to say
that a volition is the effect of the strongest motive, and yet that it
is not the effect of it; which is a plain contradiction. Such, as we
have seen, is the clear and unequivocal teaching of the Inquiry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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