It is evident that such is the course pursued by Edwards; for he not only calls a volition, an effect, but he also says, that the mind can "bring no _effects_ to pass, but what are consequent upon its acting," p. 56. And again he says, "The will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice; and _there is no other way_ of the will's determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all." This is very true, if a volition is such an effect as requires the prior action of something else to account for its production, just as the motion of the "hands and feet" requires the action of the mind to account for its production; but it is not true, if a volition is such an effect, that its existence may be accounted for by the presence of certain circumstances or motives, as the conditions of action, in conjunction with a mind capable of acting in view of such motives. In other words, his assertion is true, if we allow him to assume, as he does, that a volition is an effect, in the above restricted meaning of the term; but it is not true, if we consider a volition as an effect in a larger sense of the word. Hence, the whole strength of Edwards' position lies in the sense which he arbitrarily attaches to the term _effect_, when he says that a volition is an effect. Now, is a volition an effect in such a sense of the word? Is it brought into existence, like the motion of body, by the prior action of any thing else? We answer, No. But how shall this point be decided? The necessitarian says, a moment before the volition did not exist, now it does exist; and hence, it necessarily follows, that there must have been a cause by which it was brought into existence. That is to say, it _must_ be an effect. True, it must be an effect, if you please; but in what sense of the word? Is volition an effect, in the same sense that the motion of the body is an effect? This is the question.