CHAPTER I. OPINIONS ON THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE FOURTH OF AUGUST. DISORDERS OCCASIONED BY THOSE TRANSACTIONS. NECKER DEMANDS THE ASSEMBLY’S SANCTION TO A LOAN. A LOAN DECREED. TITHES ABOLISHED. DEBATE ON THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. THE FORMATION OF A CONSTITUTION. DEBATE ON THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THE SUSPENSIVE VETO ADOPTED. PRETENDED AND REAL VIEWS OF THE COMBINATION OF DESPOTS AGAINST FRANCE. DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF A SENATE. MEANS OF PEACEABLY EFFECTING A REFORM SHOULD MAKE A PART OF EVERY CONSTITUTION. The numerous offerings made to their country by the deputies, on the 4th of august, excited loud applause; but not without a mixture of sarcastic censure, and murmurs of disapprobation. Some blamed the decrees, which, said they, have sacrificed the property of several thousand families to the vain desire of popularity.—Others complained of the neglect of those forms, by which every assembly, that aspires at putting some maturity into it’s decrees, ought to direct it’s debates;—they disapproved of an afternoon sitting;—of the rapid succession of subjects, not allowing time for any to be weighed;—of the multiplicity of them;—and of the continual acclamations, which rendered a calm discussion physically impossible.—‘What!’ they continued, ‘shall the most important business always be treated with the levity, which characterized us before we deserved to be termed a nation? Eternally the sport of our vivacity, a happy turn decides with us the most serious point; and gay sallies are ever our substitutes for arguments.—We do madly the wisest things; and even our reason is always connected by some filament or other to inconsistency.—The national assembly had been a long time reproached for dwelling on trifling objects; and not attending sufficiently to the promotion of general good.—When suddenly—in a single night, more than twenty important laws are decided by an uproar. So much done, in such a short time, is so astonishing, that it appears like a dream.’ In reply it was said—‘Why deliberate, when all are agreed?—Does not a general good always appear self-evident?—Was it not sufficient to declare these patriotic propositions to prove their justness?—The first person, who pointed out a new tribute to the public interest, only gave utterance to what we all before felt—there was no need then of discussion or eloquence, to make that be adopted, which had already been resolved by the greater number of the deputies, and commanded by the awful authority of the nation, in their mandates.—The assembly might have proceeded more methodically; but the result could not have been more advantageous. It seemed as if all the old effects, all the mouldering titles of feudal oppressions were then put up to auction: and the kind of mistrust of the different orders, which provoked reciprocal concessions, was still for the public good.’