An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxesSteuart, James, Sir
History
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxes
Steuart, James, Sir
Economics
I think it is as rational to say, that the fatherly power proceeded
originally from the act of the children, as to say, that the great body
of the people who were fed, and protected by a few great lords, was the
fountain of power, and creator of subordination. Those who have no other
equivalent to give for their food and protection, must pay in personal
service, respect, and submission; and so soon as they come to be in a
situation to pay a proper equivalent for these dependencies, in so far
they acquire a title to liberty and independence. The feudal lords,
therefore, who, with reason, had an entire authority over many of their
vassals, being subdued by their King; the usurpation was upon _their_
rights, not upon the rights of the lower classes: but when a King came
to extend the power he had over the vassals of the lords, to the
inhabitants of cities, who had been independent of that subordination,
his usurpation became evident.
The rights of Kings, therefore, are to be sought for in history; and not
founded upon the supposition of tacit contracts between them and their
people, inferred from the principles of an imaginary law of nature,
_which makes all mankind equal_: nature can never be in opposition to
common reason.
The general principle I have laid down, appears, in my humble opinion,
more rational than that imaginary contract; and as consonant to the full
with the spirit of free government. If the original tacit contract of
government between Prince and people is admitted universally, then all
governments ought to be similar; and every subordination, which appears
contrary to the entire liberty and independence of the lowest classes,
ought to be construed as tyrannical: whereas, according to my principle,
the subordination of classes may, in different countries, be vastly
different; the prerogative of one sovereign may, from different
circumstances, be far more extended than that of another.
May not one have attained the sovereignty (by the free election of the
people, I suppose) because of the great extent of his possessions,
number of his vassals and dependents, quantity of wealth, alliances and
connexions with neighbouring sovereigns? Had not, for example, such a
person as Hugh Capet, the greatest feudal Lord of his time, a right to a
much more extensive jurisdiction over his subjects, than could
reasonably be aspired to by a King of Poland, sent from France, or from
Germany, and set at the head of a republic, where he has not one person
depending upon him for any thing?
The power of Princes, as _Princes_, must then be distinguished from the
power they derive from other circumstances, which do not necessarily
follow in consequence of their elevation to the throne. It would, I
think, be the greatest absurdity to advance, that the title of King
abolishes, of itself, the subordination due to the person who exercises
the office of that high magistracy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account