An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxesSteuart, James, Sir
History
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxes
Steuart, James, Sir
Economics
Matter of fact, which is stronger than all reasoning, demonstrates the
force of the principle here laid down. Do we not see how subordination
rises and falls under different reigns, under a rich Elizabeth, and a
necessitous Charles, under a powerful Austrian, and a distressed
Bavarian Emperor? I proceed no farther in the examination of this
matter: perhaps my reader has decided that I have gone too far already.
From these principles may be deduced the boundaries of subordination. A
people who depend upon nothing but their own industry for their
subsistence, ought to be under no farther subordination than what is
necessary for their protection. And as the protection of the whole body
of such a people implies the protection of every individual, so every
political subordination should there be general and equal: no person, no
class should be under a greater subordination than another. This is the
subordination of the laws; and whenever laws establish a subordination
more than what is proportionate to the dependence of those who are
subordinate, in so far such laws may be considered as contrary to
natural equity, and arbitrary.
These things premised, I come to the question proposed, namely, How far
particular forms of government are favourable or unfavourable to a
competition with other nations, in point of commerce?
If we reason from facts, and from experience, we shall find, that trade
and industry have been found mostly to flourish under the republican
form, and under those which have come the nearest to it. May I be
allowed to say, that, perhaps, one principal reason for this has been,
that under these forms the administration of the laws has been the most
uniform, and consequently, that most liberty has _actually_ been there
enjoyed: I say actually, because I have said above, that in my
acceptation of the term, liberty is equally compatible with monarchy as
with democracy; I do not say the enjoyment of it is equally secure under
both; because under the first it is much more liable to be destroyed.
The life of the democratical system is equality. Monarchy conveys the
idea of the greatest inequality possible. Now if, on one side, the
equality of the democracy secures liberty; on the other, the moderation
in expence discourages industry; and if, on one side, the inequality of
the monarchy endangers liberty, the progress of luxury encourages
industry on the other. From whence we may conclude, that the
democratical system is naturally the best for giving birth to foreign
trade; the monarchical, for the refinement of the luxurious arts, and
for promoting a rapid circulation of inland commerce.
The danger which liberty is exposed to under monarchy, and the
discouragement to industry, from the frugality of the democracy, are
only the natural and immediate effects of the two forms of government;
and these inconveniencies will only take place while statesmen neglect
the interest of commerce, so far as not to make it an object of
administration.
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