The war of 1756 breaking out, obliged the King to think of every expedient to increase his income. Had he set out by borrowing upon annuities for lives, at 10 _per cent._ and by mortgaging his ordinary revenue for the payment of them, his credit would have been more solid, and the plan of running in debt more systematical: but in the end, it would have involved him in the terrible dilemma of either making a bankruptcy, in order to re-instate himself in the possession of his ordinary revenue, or of making him depend more than he inclined upon his parliament; whose authority is absolutely necessary for laying a perpetual and regular imposition, which alone can form a solid basis of national credit. He was therefore resolved, in one way or other, to increase the impositions on the people in the time of war, in order to avoid the consequences he foresaw from the loss of his fixed revenue. The King’s ministers at this time could not convince the parliament of Paris, that in order to borrow money upon the best terms, it was necessary to have a sure fund for paying the interest of it. It had been usual to borrow money, on pressing occasions, from the farmers of the revenue, bankers, and financiers, as they are called, at 7 and even 10 _per cent._ They understanding the chain of the affairs of France, used to obtain credit both abroad and at home, from people who would not lend directly to the King; although they knew at the time of the loan that the money was borrowed for his use. The reason was, that the King was under an absolute necessity to keep faith with this set of men, upon whom the credit of France has depended for many ages: and as the profits they used to make were very great, ministers knew, by a sort of instinct, when they had gained enough; and in clearing their accounts in the usual way, a sufficiency was left to them, to repay what they had borrowed from others. Perhaps the parliament thought, and perhaps with reason, that in the main it was cheaper to borrow in this way, at 10 _per cent._ than in the English way, at 3 _per cent._ because of the great facility in paying off the debts which attended it; but this is only a conjecture. That there was however a contrast of sentiments between the parliament, and the minister of the finances at that time, who had contracted English ideas of credit, is most undoubted; and it was this contrast which brought on the bankruptcy in 1759, when the sinking fund was shut up against the creditors by an act of power. To judge of the sentiments of both parties with candour, let us then examine the plan of borrowing proposed by the one, and by the other. The minister, M. de Silhouëtte, proposed to the King, to levy, as a solid fund of credit to borrow upon, a general subvention, as it was called, over all France; or in other words, to make the repartition of a large annual payment, over all the cities, towns, villages, and suburbs in France.