An introduction to the theory of value : $b On the lines of Menger, Weiser, and Böhm-BawerkSmart, William
General
An introduction to the theory of value : $b On the lines of Menger, Weiser, and Böhm-Bawerk
Smart, William
Austrian school of economics; Value
=Labour as the Common Third.=—A famous theory says that value expresses
and measures the more or less of labour “embodied” in goods—the labour
involved in the getting or making of goods. This, however, involves
the idea of a Unit of Labour, _i.e._, it assumes the possibility
of bringing all labour to a common expression—a previous equation.
This difficulty seems insuperable, even when we look only at one
side of the primitive equation: can any labour be more different in
amount, intensity, and quality than that which gets gold? Suppose
this overcome, and suppose the similar difficulty of equating the
various labours involved in getting oxen overcome, what common quality
measures these two sets of labours? When, finally, one tries to weigh
head labour against hand labour, _except by the price paid for their
results_, the full impossibility stands revealed. But, of course, to
bring different labours to an equality by referring to the price paid
for their results, is to beg the whole question. Assume that things
are valuable and variously valuable, and one may pronounce that the
labour spent on them will be correspondingly valuable; but the previous
question is—Why are the products so variously valued? The hold which
the Labour Theory took in last century can be explained only by its
introduction of a moral idea making results (prices) depend on that
which makes and elevates man, namely, Labour. But it certainly would
make Value something very different from Human Valuation. (Note in
passing that this theory is not to be confounded with the Cost of
Production theory, which, indeed, is the other—the Supply—side of the
true theory.)
=Life as the Common Third.=—When Adam Smith said that water had great
value in use, and diamonds scarcely any, he suggested life as the
common third. It might, indeed, be possible to draw out a “natural
order” of values—a hierarchy of things according to their power of
sustaining an average human life. An animal or a Crusoe might value
things in this way. It is evident that in prehistoric times the ox was
adopted as the standard because of its measurable potentiality in this
respect. But, in any community that we know, “life” is too complex to
afford a basis; not only does “living” become intellectual, moral,
æsthetic, but goods naturally availing to life, becoming plentiful,
notoriously lose their value. This, however, suggests the true answer.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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