The general result is, that there are three chief kinds of nameable things:--1. Feelings distinct from the objects exciting and the organs supposed to convey them, and divisible into four classes, perceptions being only a particular case of belief, which is itself a sort of thought, while actions are only volitions followed by an effect. 2. Substances, i.e. the unknown cause and the unknown recipient of our sensations. 3. Attributes, subdivisible into Quality, Relation, Quantity. Of these ([Greek: a]) qualities, like substances, are known only by the states of consciousness which they excite, and on which they are based, and by which alone, though they are treated as a distinct class, they can be described. ([Greek: b]) Relations also, with four exceptions, are based on some fact, i.e. a series of states of consciousness. ([Greek: g]) Quantity is, in the same way, based on our sensations. In short, all attributes are only our sensations and other feelings, or something involved in them. We may, then, classify nameable things thus:--1, Feelings; 2, Minds; 3, Bodies, together with the properties whereby they are _popularly_ (though the evidence is very deficient) supposed to excite sensations; 4, the relations of Succession and Coexistence, Likeness and Unlikeness, which subsist really only between states of consciousness. These four classes are a substitute for Aristotle's abortive Categories. As they comprise all nameable things, every fact is made up of them or some of them; those that are called _subjective_ facts being composed wholly of feelings as such, and the _objective_ facts, though composed wholly or partly of substances and attributes, being grounded on corresponding subjective facts. CHAPTER IV. PROPOSITIONS.