Ancient rhetoric and poetic : $b Interpreted from representative worksBaldwin, Charles Sears
History
Ancient rhetoric and poetic : $b Interpreted from representative works
Baldwin, Charles Sears
Classical literature -- History and criticism -- Theory, etc.; Poetics -- History -- To 1500; Rhetoric, Ancient
Aristotle’s division and its order are the division and the order
not merely of analysis, but of much the same synthesis as underlies
the actual processes of composition. I begin with myself; for the
subject-matter else is dead, remaining abstract. It begins to live,
to become persuasive, when it becomes my message. Then only have I
really a subject for presentation. A subject, for purposes of address
as distinct from purposes of investigation, must include the speaker.
It is mine if it arouses me. I consider next the audience, not for
concession or compromise, but for adaptation. What is mine must become
theirs. Therefore I must know them, their ἦθος and their πάθος. My
address becomes concrete through my effort to bring it home. The truth
must prevail—through what? Against what? Not only through or against
reasoning, but through or against complexes of general moral habit and
the emotions of the occasion. I must establish sympathy, win openness of
mind, instruct in such wise as to please and awaken, rouse to action.
My speech is for these people now. Only thus am I ready to consider
composition; for only thus can I know what arguments are available, or
what order will be effective, or what style will tell.
This is the philosophy of presentation. What is its practise? Rhetoric
ranges for subject-matter most often in the fields of social ethics and
politics, tempting its professors, Aristotle adds acutely, to assume the
mask of politics.[9] It deals with “the ordinary and recognized subjects
of deliberation,”[10] with matters still in dispute and doubt. Thus
dealing with social and political conduct, it can neither proceed, as
logic does, by absolute propositions nor arrive at logical demonstration.
Its premises are not universals, but generally accepted probabilities.
That is, to resume his previous distinction, the mode of rhetoric is
not the syllogism or induction proper to logical formulation, but the
enthymeme or instances proper to actual presentation. The mode of
scientific induction emerges to-day in the “gas laws” or the formula
of the velocity of light; the mode of rhetoric emerges in Huxley’s
“Piece of Chalk.” Abstract deduction is summed up in the syllogism;[11]
concrete deduction, in the enthymeme. By enthymeme, as Aristotle has
now made fully clear, is meant a “rhetorical syllogism” in the sense of
a deduction available concretely for presentation, as distinct from a
deduction formulated abstractly for analysis. His enthymeme is deductive
method used constructively. It is not mere popular reasoning, logic
modified for popular consumption, but public reasoning, such reasoning
as is available with the public for building up public opinion and policy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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