1. _prudenter_, with wise forecast of the whole = _inventio_; 2. _composite_,[12] with skill in arrangement = _dispositio_; 3. _ornate_, with command of enhancing words = _elocutio_; 4. _memoriter_, with sure memory = _memoria_; 5. _cum actionis dignitate_, with dignity of delivery = _actio_. But the traditional five parts of rhetoric are more than the table of contents of the manuals (_artes_). They constitute what we now call in college schedules a group of studies; and Crassus is contending for the group as a whole. What he has been insisting on is the importance and the scope of that first part which, in the long history of rhetoric, teachers have most often and most dangerously neglected, _inventio_, the investigation, analysis, and grasp of the subject-matter. He adds[13] that the orator, though in any given case he may gather his information from authorities, will express this information as no expert can express it; and he repeats that in one branch of knowledge he must himself be an expert, namely in human nature. The practical difficulty of such a conception of oratory, rejoins Antonius,[14] is that we have not leisure to realize it. And if we had, should we not better spend our time on the practise of speaking? The manuals,[15] he adds somewhat evasively, have nothing to say about justice, temperance, etc.; they talk of introductions and perorations. The main thing[16] is that the orator should appear to his auditory to be the sort of man that he wishes to appear. That is the result of dignity of life, about which theories of rhetoric have no more to say than about the means by which men are moved [Crassus might have retorted by citing Aristotle’s whole second book]. No rhetorician[17] was ever even a tolerable orator; many orators have never studied rhetoric. The materials of rhetoric [in the large sense of material urged by Crassus] are too indeterminate[18] for an art. “I call him a master[19] who can speak keenly and clearly to an average audience from the average point of view; but I call him eloquent[20] who more wondrously and largely can enhance and adorn what he will, and hold in mind and memory all the sources of all things that pertain to public speaking.” But what pertains to public speaking? How widely should the training for it range? The definition of Antonius obviously stresses _elocutio_. Whether he means to make this the main concern of the orator depends on whether he includes among his “sources” the fund of knowledge urged by Crassus. The context seems to show that he does not. To put his definition beside that of Crassus above is to see that its intention is narrower. It specifies no more than style, first as the amplitude and vividness that enhance a particular passage, and secondly as the orator’s general virtuosity.