Ancient rhetoric and poetic : $b Interpreted from representative worksBaldwin, Charles Sears
History
Ancient rhetoric and poetic : $b Interpreted from representative works
Baldwin, Charles Sears
Classical literature -- History and criticism -- Theory, etc.; Poetics -- History -- To 1500; Rhetoric, Ancient
“But finally[34] to bring the orator whom we are forming to
actual cases ... we will teach him first—laugh if you will—to
know them thoroughly and deeply. This is not taught in school;
for the cases assigned to boys are easy. For example: ‘The
statute forbids a stranger (_peregrinus_) to climb a wall;
[this man] climbed; he repulsed the enemy; he is brought to
trial.’ No labor to know a case of this sort; for rightly
nothing is taught [in school] about studying a case. But in
the forum one has to know documents, contracts and agreements,
decrees, the lives of the parties. Through carelessness in
getting such knowledge men who in their anxiety to appear much
in demand undertake too many cases often lose.[35] Not only so,
but they may be suspected of bad faith or of incompetence.
“For my part,[36] I take pains to learn the case from the
client himself, alone, that he may talk more freely, and to
debate against him, that he may defend himself and advance
whatever arguments he has thought out. When I have dismissed
him, I quite dispassionately take three parts: my own, my
opponent’s, the judge’s. Whatever arguments promise more help
than embarrassment I settle on, rejecting others in the same
way. By this plan I manage to think at one time and speak at
another.[37] Some speakers have the confidence to do both at
once; but I am sure that they too would speak somewhat better
if they recognized the advisability of setting aside one time
for thought, another for speech.”
Though this is a conventional topic, and though its application here is
legal, it is none the less instructive generally; and it might directly
improve the teaching of argument and the practise of debate in our
colleges.
The second heading under _inventio_ is also conventional, the _status_,
or determination of the main character of the case and the main issues.
The _status_ was determined in the classical system by applying certain
traditional questions. The _status legalis_ may be set aside as
applicable only to legal pleading. The _status rationalis_, or _status_
considered in the general aspects of reason as an affair of common
argument, was determined by asking oneself how far the debate hinged
(1) on fact, on whether such-and-such things had happened, or (2) on
definition, the facts being generally admitted, or (3) more broadly, on
the interpretation of admitted facts and definitions. Though most cases
need to be looked at from all these three points of view, in most there
will be found a decided predominance of one; and forecast of this will
direct the emphasis of the whole argument, will tell where to throw one’s
weight. This one is the _status_ of that case.
In the Latin terms:
(1) if the main question is _an sit_, the _status_ is
_coniectura_, or _status coniecturalis_;
(2) if it is _quid sit_, the _status_ is _finis_, or _status
definitivus_;
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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