10. (v) _Good of love is good only so far as it is united to truth of wisdom, and truth of wisdom is truth only so far as it is united to good of love._ Good and truth have this from their origin, the one and the other originating in the Lord, who is good itself and truth itself and in whom the two are one. Hence in angels in heaven and men on earth, good is not good basically except so far as it is joined to truth, and truth is not truth basically except so far as it is joined to good. Granted that all good and truth are from the Lord, then inasmuch as good makes one with truth and truth with good in Him, good to be good in itself and truth to be truth in itself must make one in the recipient, that is, the angel in heaven or the man on earth. 11. It is indeed known that all things in the world are referable to good and truth. For by good is meant what universally embraces and involves all things of love; and by truth what universally embraces and involves all things of wisdom. Still it is not known that good is nothing except when it is joined to truth, and truth nothing unless it is joined to good. Good apart from truth and truth apart from good still seem to be something; yet they are not. For love (to which all that is called good pertains) is the _esse_ of a thing, and wisdom (to which all things called truths pertain) is a thing's _existere_ from that _esse_ (as was shown in the treatise _Divine Love and Wisdom,_ nn. 14-16). Therefore, as _esse_ is nothing apart from _existere,_ or _existere_ apart from _esse,_ good is nothing apart from truth or truth from good. What, again, is good which has no relation to anything? Can it be called good if it is without affection and perception? [2] That which is associated with good, permitting it to affect and to be perceived and felt, is referable to truth, since it has relation to what is in the understanding. Tell someone, not that a given thing is good, but simply say "good"--is good anything? It becomes something from what is perceived along with it. This is united with good only in the understanding, and all understanding has relation to truth. It is the same with willing. Apart from knowing, perceiving and thinking what one wills, to will is nothing actual; together with them it becomes something. All volition is of love and is referable to good; and all knowing, perceiving and thinking is of the understanding, and is referable to truth. It is clear, then, that to will is nothing actual, but to will this or that means something. [3] So also with a use, inasmuch as a use is a good. Unless a use is addressed to something which makes one with it, it is not a use, and thus not anything. A use derives its something from the understanding, and what is thence conjoined or adjoined to it, has relation to truth. So a use gets its character.