Yet another way of putting the same essential distinction is to say that intelligence deals with pictures, either directly presented to the senses or called up in re-presentation. If we state the matter thus, however, we must remember that the “pictures” may be painted in colours supplied by any of the senses; and that smells, tastes, sounds, touches, pressures, limb-movements, and so forth, are elements in the pictured product. Bearing this in mind, we may say that intelligence deals with sensory impressions and their revived images in concrete and particular situations; while reason analyzes the pictures, and extracts from them general notions in terms of which the pictures may be explained. For example, we picture a stone falling to the earth; but we explain it by the general notion of gravitative attraction. The conception forms part of our ideal scheme of knowledge, which is not itself picturable, though this or that example of its action may be presented or re-presented in sensory imagery. Once more we may say--and this way of looking at the question arises naturally out of what has gone before--that intelligence deals with concrete examples, and does not rise to the abstract and general rule. The ideal scheme of reason is the result of abstraction and generalization. It is a framework of conceptions which can be applied to the particular facts which fall under observation to see whether it fits and meets the case. Intelligence has to deal with the facts as they present themselves, without the aid of an organized system of knowledge built up into an ideal scheme. Enough has now been said to indicate the distinction between the method of intelligence and that of reason. It may, no doubt, be said that the terminology used is open to criticism; for, on the one hand, the words “intelligence” and “intelligent” are frequently used as synonymous with “reason” and “rational;” and, on the other hand, acts requiring neither abstraction, generalization, nor the application of any scheme of knowledge are frequently spoken of as “rational.” Hence there is, it may be urged, some danger of misunderstanding. This may be granted. And unless some such restriction of meaning under suitable terms be accepted by psychologists, misunderstanding will continue. More essential, however, than the distinctive terms we are to use is the distinction of method which underlies them. That, I trust, is sound. Dr. Lindley, in an interesting paper on “A Study of Puzzles,”[61] has utilized the distinction in his investigation of the mental development of children, and has found that the procedure of young children is predominantly of the “sense-trial and error” order which has above been termed intelligent; and he expresses the opinion that “most of the adaptations of animals are on this sense-trial and error level.”