Now, when a mammal is born, a bird is hatched, an insect emerges from
the chrysalis, we have, if not the beginning, at any rate a great and
sudden extension of the range of effective consciousness. In the case
of the mammal and bird the experience gained in the womb or within the
egg-shell is presumably of little value for the wider life upon which
an entrance is made. It is true that an insect has passed through a
previous stage of active and no doubt consciously guided existence as
a caterpillar. But we do not know whether the experience thus acquired
is effectual for use in the later imago stage. And we may perhaps
infer from the extensive remodelling of the nervous system, which
occurs during the chrysalis sleep, that this itself serves to break
the continuity of experience. In any case the newly hatched chick, if
it inherit no experience, and can have gained little of guiding value
in the egg, enters upon a situation which from the number and variety
of the data supplied may well seem to us bewildering. If we picture
ourselves in such a position, with sights, sounds, motor sensations,
touches, and pressures raining in upon a virgin experience, we wonder
how we should make a beginning; how we could possibly decide on
the first step towards reducing this multiplicity and diversity to
something like unity and order. And perhaps we wonder how we ourselves
made a beginning when we were pink newly born babies.
If it may be said without paradox, we never did make a beginning. The
beginning was made for us. For we habitually associate ourselves with
the control centres, and regard our bodies, like our watches, as ours
and not us. We wind the bodily watch, and set its hands from time to
time; but we did not make it, and it was already going when heredity
handed it to us over the counter of birth. The first step towards
reducing the seeming chaos of sensory experience to something like
order is not due to the selection by consciousness of this or that
element for prominence among the rest, but to the thrusting forward
of certain modes of behaviour by the conditions of organic life. The
differentiation of the field of vision in the chick is not effected
by any conscious determination to fix the attention on that wriggling
maggot, but through the congenital response it calls forth. This serves
not only to make the grub stand out clearly amid its surroundings, but
also to emphasize a motor group, called into vigorous action in the
midst of other motor sensations, and, in rapid sequence, to lay stress
on a sensation of taste suddenly called into prominence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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