Our examination of the way science treats these six facts shows no impassable cleft between knowledge of a man’s body and knowledge of his mind. Scientific statements about the toothache, anxiety and numerical judgment are in general more variable than statements about length, hair-color and body-temperature, but there is here no difference save of degree. Some physical facts, such as hair-color, eye-color or health, are, in fact, judged more variably than some mental facts, such as rate of adding, accuracy of perception of a certain sort and the like. So far as the lack of agreement amongst impartial observers goes, there is continuity from the identification of a length to that of an ideal. Scientific judgments about the facts of John’s mind also depend, in general, more upon his verbal reports than do judgments about his body. But here also the difference is only of degree. The physician studying wounds, ulcers, tumors, infections and other facts of a man’s body may depend more upon his verbal reports than does the moralist who is studying the man’s character. Verbal reports too are themselves a gradual and continuous extension of coarser forms of behavior. They signify consciousness no more truly than do signs, gestures, facial expression and the general bodily motions of pursuit, retreat, avoidance or seizure. Nor is it true that physical facts are known to many observers and mental facts to but one, who _is_ or _has_ or _directly experiences_ them. If it were true, sociology, economics, history, anthropology and the like would either be physical sciences or represent no knowledge at all. The kind of knowledge of which these sciences and the common judgments of our fellow men are made up is knowledge possessed by many observers in common, the individual of whom the facts is known, knowing the fact in part in just the same way that the others know it. The real difference between a man’s scientific judgments about himself and the judgment of others about him is that he has _added sources of knowledge_. Much of what goes on in him influences him in ways other than those in which it influences other men. But this difference is not coterminous with that between judgments about his ‘mind’ and about his ‘body.’ As was pointed out in the case of body-temperature, a man knows certain facts about his own body in such additional ways.