So far it has been shown that: The majority of responses are not produced by ideas of them. The idea of a response may be impotent to produce it. The idea of one act may produce a different, even an opposite act. When an idea seems to produce a response in and of itself, it may really act by determining the satisfyingness of responses otherwise made. These facts are sufficient to destroy the pretensions of any general law that the image of an act will, other things being equal, produce it. But the possibility that such an image may occasionally exercise this peculiar potency remains. I despair of convincing the reader that it does not. Man is the only animal possessing a large fund of ideas of acts, and man’s connection-system is so complex and his ideas of acts are so intricately bound to situations that have by use and effect produced those acts, that the proof of this negative is a practical impossibility. But it is possible to show that even the most favored cases for the production of a response by securing an ideal representation of it may be explainable by use and effect alone. The extreme apparent potency of ideas representing acts to produce them regardless of bonds of use or effect is, of course, witnessed in the phenomena of suggestion in hypnosis and allied states. To try to reduce these phenomena to consequences of the laws of habit may seem fanatical. Here, it will be said, are the crucial cases where the idea of an act, if freed from all effects of opposing ideas, does inevitably produce the act so far as it is a possibility for the animal’s action-system. That is precisely what I cannot find proof of. Efficient suggestions to hypnotized subjects, on the contrary, are often ambiguous in the sense that they seem as likely to arouse a situation _to which the act has been bound by the law of habit_ as to arouse an idea of the act. Often they are far better suited to the former purpose. Direct commands—Walk, Dance, Get up, Sit down—obviously will operate by the law of habit provided the situations connected with disobedience are excluded. This is also the case with such indirect suggestions as ‘This is a knife (stick).’ ‘This is your sword (broom).’ ‘Have a cigar (a pen).’ The release of a suggestion from inhibitions may as well be the release from _ideas connected as antecedents with_ not performing the act as the release from _ideas of_ not performing it. It is a question of fact whether, to get an act done by the subject, one must arouse in him an idea to which or to a part of which or to something like which the act has been bound by use or effect, or may arouse simply an idea of the act.