[FV] "Outlines of Psychology," p. 153. [FW] Ibid. p. 339. [FX] "Science of Thought," p. 453. [FY] For compound or generic ideas "not consciously fixed and signed by means of an abstract name," Mr. Romanes ("Mental Evolution in Man," p. 36) has suggested the term "recept." In the photographic psychology which he adopts, the percept is an individual and particular photograph, the recept a generalized or composite photograph. "The word 'recept,'" he says, "is seen to be appropriate to the class of ideas in question, because, in receiving such ideas, the mind is passive." This, it will be observed, is in opposition to the teaching of this chapter, in which the activity of the mind in perception has been insisted on. Mr. Romanes's recepts answer in part to what I have termed _constructs_, which, as we have seen, are, as a rule, from the first general rather than particular, and in part to concepts reached through analysis. Mr. Romanes, for example, speaks of ideas of principles (e.g. the principle of the screw) and ideas of qualities (e.g. good-for-eating and not-good-for-eating) as recepts (p. 60). On the other hand, Mr. Mivart ("The Origin of Human Reason," p. 59; see also his work "On Truth") terms such generic affections "sensuous universals." It may be well to append Mr. Romanes's and Mr. Mivart's tabular statements. _Mr. Romanes._ { General, abstract, or notional = Concepts. IDEAS { Complex, compound, or mixed = Recepts, or generic ideas. { Simple, particular, or concrete = Memories of percepts. _Mr. Mivart._ { General or true universals = Concepts. IDEAS { Particular or individual = Percepts. { Groups of actual experiences } SENSITIVE { combined with sensuous } = Sensuous universals, COGNITIVE { reminiscences } or recepts. AFFECTIONS { Groups of simply juxtaposed } = Sense-perceptions, { actual experiences } or sencepts. In Mr. Mivart's terminology, the representations of the lower group are "mental images" or "phantasmata." The term "consciousness" is by him restricted to the higher region of ideas, the term "consentience" being applied to the faculty by which cognitive affections are felt, unified, and grouped without consciousness. _There is a difference in kind_, according to Mr. Mivart, between "consentience" and "consciousness;" and the former could therefore never develop into the latter, nor the latter be evolved from the former. For this reason (because of the philosophy it is intended to carry with it) I shall not employ the word "consentience," which would otherwise be a useful term.