[FZ] We do not speak of the filling in the complement of a percept (the construction of the object at the bidding of a simple impression) as a matter of conscious inference. I do not consciously _infer_ that yonder moss-rose is scented. Scent is an integral part of the construct. From the appearance of the rose, I may, however, infer that a rose-chafer has disturbed its petals. The complement of the percept, if inferred at all, is unconsciously inferred. [GA] "Outlines of Psychology," p. 392. [GB] "Outlines of Psychology," p. 414. [GC] Mr. Romanes adopts a different use of the terms "reason" and "rational," to which allusion will be made in the next chapter. CHAPTER IX. MENTAL PROCESSES IN ANIMALS: THEIR POWERS OF PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE. Two things I have been especially anxious to bring out prominently in the foregoing chapter: first, that the world we see around us is a joint product of two factors--the outward existence, on the one hand, and our active mind on the other; and secondly, that our mental processes and products fall under two categories--on the one hand, perception, giving rise to percepts, perceptual inferences, and intelligence, and on the other, conception (involving the analysis of phenomena), giving rise to concepts, conceptual inferences, and reason. Now, I am anxious that the former--to take that first--should be laid hold of and really grasped as an indubitable fact. It is implied in the word "phenomena," that is to say, appearances. We can only know the world as it appears to us; and the world is for us what it appears. There is nothing here in conflict with common sense; the practical reality of phenomena is altered no whit. Suppose philosophy tries to get behind phenomena, so as to get a peep at the world beyond. Suppose Carlyle tells us that "All visible things are emblems; what thou seest is not there on its own account; strictly taken, is not there [as such] at all; matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some idea and _body_ it forth." Has he altered the reality of the phenomena themselves? Not in the smallest degree. Suppose the materialist gives us his analysis of phenomena. Are not the phenomena he analyzes still the same, still equally real? No matter how far he analyzes phenomena, behind phenomena he cannot get. The materialist resolves all phenomena into matter in motion or into energy, and says that these are the only real existences. But they are no more real (they are a good deal less real to most of us) than the phenomena with which he started. How can the results of analysis be more real than that which is analyzed? Moreover, the matter and energy are still phenomena, and involve, as such, the percipient mind. Do what you will, you cannot get rid of the mental factor in phenomena.