The law of divorce should be a set of social rules applied to the law of nature, and little else. Complicated procedure, or difficulty in obtaining bare justice, is entirely beyond the mark in this branch of jurisprudence. The Crown--one hesitates to say “the State” in these days of attempted Socialism--could confer a practical benefit on the public by reducing the whole law of divorce to a few simple issues, free from the ramifications of torment and irritation which apply at present. A Royal Commission is not needed to unconsciously hide, rather than to uncover, the discrepancies of the law. The process of wallowing in volumes of evidence is confusing to say the least. It is a process, nevertheless, which, it may not be impertinent to assume, is the main fault with the Royal Commission on Divorce. It has sat and sat and sat again. It has heard the evidence of persons theoretically qualified to give evidence on the subject. It has listened, not without impatience, perhaps, to every sort of opinion, some, by the way, of a praiseworthy, and even ingenious character, but a frank contemplation of life as it is would have resulted in a better point of view than all the formal procedure on earth combined. An absence of sufficient consideration, so far as the purely human side of a problem is concerned, must inevitably lead to failure where the subject is divorce--of all things. For instance, as the law stands, what is the result of tying the hands of an erring husband and an erring wife? One of two things. Either the loose condition already illustrated, or the connivance of the parties in question, in the matter of a petition. Both are hopelessly undesirable, even wicked, and, consequently, no honest support can be extended to a continuance of such a legal anomaly. A law which gives any inducement to vice, directly or indirectly, or makes vice an alternative to uncomfortable virtue, unexpected virtue, should be definitely altered to meet the demands of the social system. There are many other variations arising from the existing state of the law. Suppose a married woman commits adultery and her husband takes action to secure a divorce. The six months interval between the decree _nisi_ and the decree absolute may just frustrate a co-respondent’s desire to marry the respondent in time to give his name to a child of the _liaison_. All these things should be considered, indeed _would be_ considered, if the members of the Divorce Commission were to deal with the whole question from a human standpoint, rather than from a standpoint of apathetic contemplation.