Dr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from the mind except space and duration. He allows then at least, that there is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind. Yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude the idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This Deity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms which but ill agree together. The infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, and independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most desireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence, Dr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that he wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions. That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant, that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is