[11]There are a number of primitive hordes to whom every stranger not a member of the horde is an enemy, and where it is right to damage the enemy to the best of one’s power and ability, and if possible to kill him. This custom is based largely on the idea of the solidarity of the horde, and on the feeling that it is the duty of every member of the horde to destroy all possible enemies.... The feeling of the fellowship in the horde corresponds to the feeling of unity in the tribe, to a recognition of bonds established by a neighborhood of habitat, and further on to the feeling of fellowship among members of nations. “He who is not with me is against me,”[12] said Jesus for the religious group. How far we have proceeded from the horde in our civilized nations, and how near we are to it still in the essential character of the mind of the group! 3. Does the group mind exist? Not as a super-consciousness, external to the individuals composing it—that view has been discarded long ago. But as a category which is needed to explain many phenomena, and which we can then proceed to study and explain in greater detail, a term with pragmatic value, such as “life” or “mind.” “Life” is no longer used as a principle of explanation, as a vital principle which is infused into dead matter, but life exists, for all that, and we can see its effects and study them. “Mind” is not something separate and distinct from the body in which it dwells or from the world in which it acts, but we know that mind is a useful and necessary category in which to include a whole phase of living being, especially of human life. “Group Mind” is the same sort of category as these. Just as mind inheres in the neurones and is coincident with the chemical changes in them, and yet cannot be summed up by chemical changes; so group mind inheres in the brains, of individuals and is coincident with individual ideas and acts, yet cannot be summed up as so many individual responses but as the unified response of a group of persons at once. Morris Ginsberg, in his Psychology of Society, opposes any type of group theory, as he sees only individuals in a social environment; he holds that the group may have unity of content but not of process, of ideas and ideals but not of mind. Floyd H. Allport speaks of “The group fallacy,”[13] “the error of substituting the group as a whole as a principle of explanation in place of the individuals in the group,” to which Emory S. Bogardus replies in his discussion that [14]“if there is a group fallacy, there is also an individual fallacy.”