_Ants and Some Other Insects_ _An Inquiry into_ _The Psychic Powers of these Animals_ _With an Appendix on_ _The Peculiarities of Their Olfactory Sense_ _By_ _Dr. August Forel_ _Late Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Zurich_ _Translated from the German_ _By_ _Prof. William Morton Wheeler_ _American Museum of Natural History, New York_ _Chicago_ _The Open Court Publishing Company_ _London_ _Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd._ _1904_ COPYRIGHT, 1904 THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. CHICAGO ANTS AND SOME OTHER INSECTS. When discussing the ant-mind, we must consider that these small animals, on the one hand, differ very widely from ourselves in organisation, but on the other hand, have come, through so-called convergence, to possess in the form of a social commonwealth a peculiar relationship to us. My subject, however, requires the discussion of so many complicated questions that I am compelled to assume acquaintance with the work of others, especially the elements of psychology, and in addition the works of P. Huber, Wasmann, von Buttel-Reepen, Darwin, Romanes, Lubbock, my _Fourmis de la Suisse_, and many others. Since the functions of the sense-organs constitute the basis of comparative psychology, I must also refer to a series of articles entitled “Sensations des Insectes” which I have recently published (1900-1901) in the _Rivista de Biologia Generale_, edited by Dr. P. Celesia. In these papers I have defined my position with respect to various authors, especially Plateau and Bethe. Very recently Bethe, Uexkull, and others have denied the existence of psychic powers in invertebrate animals. They explain the latter as reflex-machines, and take their stand on the ground of the so-called psycho-physical parallelism for the purpose of demonstrating our inability to recognise mental qualities in these animals. They believe, however, that they can prove the mechanical regularity of behavior, but assume unknown forces whenever they are left in the lurch in their explanations. They regard the mind as first making its appearance in the vertebrates, whereas the old Cartesians regarded all animals, in contradistinction to man, as mindless (unconscious) machines. The Jesuit father E. Wasmann and von Buttel-Reepen are willing, on the other hand, to accept the inductive inference from analogy as a valid scientific method. Like Lubbock, the lecturer and others, they advocate a comparative psychology of the invertebrates and convincingly demonstrate the existence of psychic faculties in these animals. Wasmann, however, puts a very low estimate on the mental powers of the higher vertebrates and, in my opinion, improperly, denies to them any ability of drawing inferences from experience when in the presence of new conditions (this alone he designates as intelligence); he believes that man alone possesses an immortal soul (independent of natural laws?) in addition to the animal mind.