_Socr._ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all others together. _Cri._ It is so. _Socr._ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil? _Cri._ How should he not? _Socr._ But what is this evil? Whither does it tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall? _Cri._ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins. _Socr._ You say well. The case is the same, too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them all. With respect then, to things just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing? _Cri._ I agree with you, Socrates. 8. _Socr._ Come, then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not? _Cri._ Yes. _Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body? _Cri._ By no means. _Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are concerned' _Cri._ By no means. _Socr._ But of more value? _Cri._ Much more. _Socr._ We must not then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just and the unjust, the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honorable and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say, are not the multitude able to put us to death? _Cri._ This, too, is clear, Socrates, any one might say so. _Socr._ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10]. And consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not, that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well. _Cri._ It does hold good. _Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same thing? _Cri._ It does.