Our position is that this is in direct contravention of the Constitution. If you will substitute in that clause the word used by the Constitution, and say that the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall include all the "writings" of an author, then we do not object to that section. Now, if you will take certain other sections of this bill, with that change made in section 4, and attempt to read them, particularly where the word "reproduce" occurs, or the word "reproductions" occurs, you will see the importance of it to us. Take, for example, section 3, immediately above: That the copyright provided by this act shall extend to and protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, any and all reproductions or copies thereof. If you read that word "reproductions" with the word "works" in section 4 changed to "writings," reproduction means a very different thing. If you will turn to section 18, on page 14, subclause b, you will find this language: Any arrangement or reproduction in some new form of a musical composition. Mr. CHANEY. What do you understand the word "works" to mean in section 4? Mr. CAMERON. It may mean anything that is reduced to writing, or that is not reduced to writing. It may be an oral speech that is absolutely wafted upon the winds of the air and never gets into permanent form. In proof of that we go to section 5, line 20: "Oral lectures, sermons, addresses." The talking-machine art stands in a somewhat different position from that of the perforated music roll. You take a sheet of music and you have Sousa's or any other band play that music into the horn of an instrument, a patented apparatus. That machine engraves lines corresponding to what? To the sound waves produced by the band or the voice of the performer on the wax or other tablet. Now, if you make that word "works" read "writings," as I understand, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the word "writings," it means this, in its broadest signification: That the idea of the author has been recorded in some tangible form, in such a way that another, through the eye, may have the idea of the author impressed upon his brain. That may be a painting; it may be the work of an artist. I think the Supreme Court has included a painting under that term because of that very fact, that the idea of the artist was recorded in some tangible form and, through the eye of the beholder, the idea of the artist was conveyed to the brain of the beholder. That is what a writing is, as I understand it, within the meaning of the Constitution. Mr. CHANEY. The effect of your argument is, then, to limit the word to something that can be read by anybody? Mr. CAMERON. Not necessarily by anybody. Mr. CURRIER. But by somebody? Mr. CAMERON. Yes. I can not read Sanskrit. Mr. CHANEY. I mean to say, that can be read by persons understanding the same language?