Mr. WALKER. Then you are liable for the penalty. Now, that section 4966 has been violated more than a million times since Congress enacted it in 1897, and Congress does not notice the difference; and I take it that it has taken no steps to vindicate its dignity. Mr. BONYNGE. There is a bill pending before our committee on that proposition. Mr. WALKER. Yes; I understand about that pending bill, but I am speaking of the law as it now exists. So that, gentlemen, I take the ground that any legislation that gives to the composer of any music the exclusive right to publicly perform that music is outside of the Constitution, because a copyright on a writing can be infringed only by writing; and when some gentleman or some lady stands up in a church and sings a song out of his or her mind he or she is not doing anything about any writing. Clause G is one to which I direct attention. That clause G is the one that is directed against all music-playing instruments. The gentleman who preceded me did not make entirely clear the nature of this beautiful instrument that he showed the committee, which he stated was capable of rendering music. What he showed to the committee was a perfectly plain steel cylinder. When you look at it you can see no---- Mr. CURRIER. Most members of both committees are perfectly familiar with that instrument. Mr. WALKER. Very well; I am very glad to hear that. There are a very great many persons who are not. Mr. CURRIER. That instrument was exhibited before the House committees in the Fifty-seventh Congress. Mr. WALKER. Oh, yes--then you know all about it. There are a great many gentlemen who have not been informed about it, and I thought I would mention it. Aside from the matters of constitutional consideration--I have twelve minutes left, and during those twelve minutes I wish to devote myself to some criticisms of this bill which have nothing to do with the constitutional questions that I have been discussing. Those criticisms are equally applicable whether the bill is to be framed and enacted on the basis of "works," or whether it is to be framed and enacted on the basis of "writings." And in any view that anybody may take about the scope of the copyright, the criticisms to which I am now calling attention deserve consideration. The first one is in section 13, which is one of those sections that is intended to give the American manufacturer the monopoly of manufacturing copyrighted books. That purpose is a good one, but that section is not well drawn to effect that purpose, because the gentlemen who drew the section were not thoroughly acquainted with the art of printing in its modern development; and the suggestions I have to make to the committee are with a view to strengthening that section so as to close up some loopholes that the authors of the section left wide open. The language is: