First of all, the bill does extend the privilege of copyright to preventing the reproduction of musical sound or spoken words by machinery. That was spoken of before the committee yesterday. All that I can say about it is that this body whom I represent, although some of them have special interests in it (and they wish to be heard on it hereafter), in general look upon the matter as the circuit court of the United States in the second circuit looked upon it in their last decision on the subject, as being a matter germane to the copyright law, relating to the same kind of rights that Congress has hitherto protected, and that they see no reason why such rights should not hereafter be properly protected; and they respectfully refer the committee, so far as their suggestion goes, to the special information and advice of those on both sides of the question who have the greatest interest in it and the greatest capacity to inform the committee in regard to it. The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the citation of the decision that you have mentioned? Mr. OLIN. I can hand it to you. A printed copy of the decision was handed to me yesterday. It has not yet been reported. Mr. CHANEY. That was the decision that was distributed yesterday? Mr. OLIN. Yes; that is the one. The CHAIRMAN. Unless there is objection on the part of the committee, we will have this decision put in the record. (The decision referred to is as follows:) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT. White-Smith Music Publishing Company, appellant, against Apollo Company, respondent. Judges Lacombe, Coxe, and Townsend. These causes come here upon appeal from a decree of the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York dismissing bill alleging infringement of copyright. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court below. (139 Fed. 427.) Per curiam: The questions raised in these cases are of vast importance and involve far-reaching results. They have been exhaustively discussed in the clear and forcible briefs and arguments of counsel. We are of the opinion that the rights sought to be protected by these suits belong to the same class as those covered by the specific provisions of the copyright statutes, and that the reasons which led to the passage of said statutes apply with great force to the protection of rights of copyright against such an appropriation of the fruits of an author's conception as results from the acts of defendant.