[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i. ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr. Mill says:--"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads." (Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol. p. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes tê\n diai/resin ô(s polla\ pariei=san kai\ mê\ perilamba/nousan, ê)\ kai\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.] And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be ranked often under more than one head.) "That could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter and Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of erecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among substances or among attributes." Among the many deficiencies of the Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more glaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek: Kei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek: to\ de\ a)nakei=sthai ê)\ e(sta/nai ê)\ kathê=sthai au)ta\ me\n ou)k ei)si\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark, that it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_. [Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He