is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\x protei/nôn], &c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily distinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general word [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under Greek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai, e(sta/nai, kathê=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but to come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek: Kei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_. Again, to Mr. Mill's question, "In what Category are we to place sensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain, pleasure, thought, judgment," &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I apprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of _Pati_--[Greek: Poio/têtes] or [Greek: Pa/thê]. They are attributes or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos], and we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/schôn ti]; if it be a durable disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations, it is [Greek: poio/tês], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s tis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental and bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ tou/tois kai\ kata\ tê\n psuchê\n pathêtikai\ poio/têtes kai\ pa/thê le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33). The line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and [Greek: poio/tês], but one or other of the two will comprehend all the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have admitted that "feelings are to be counted among realities," except as they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some other _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as attributes belonging to these [Greek: Prô=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the Substance to which they belong. Mr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He takes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the [Greek: prô=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and Kallias.]