two; it can _never_ be the _less_ extensive of the two, since the aggregate of individuals cannot possibly exceed totality, though it may fall short thereof. I have given in the text what I think the true meaning of Aristotle, departing from the translations of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Sir** W. Hamilton.] [Footnote 56: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 30-38: [Greek: e)/sti d' o( toiou=tos sullogismo\s tê=s prô/tês kai\ a)me/sou prota/seôs; ô(=n me\n ga/r e)sti me/son, dia\ tou= me/sou o( sullogismo/s, ô(=n de\ mê/ e)sti, di' e)pagôgê=s.--phu/sei me\n ou)=n pro/teros kai\ gnôrimô/teros o( dia\ tou= me/sou sullogismo/s, ê(mi=n d' e)narge/steros o( dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s.]] From Induction he proceeds to Example. You here take in (besides the three terms, major, middle, and minor, of the Syllogism) a fourth term; that is, a new particular case analogous to the minor. Your purpose here is to show--not, as in the ordinary Syllogism, that the major term is predicable of the minor, but, as in the Inductive Syllogism--that the major term is predicable of the middle term; and you prove this conclusion, not (as in the Inductive Syllogism) through the minor term, but through the new case or fourth term analogous to the minor.[57] Let A represent evil or mischievous; B, war against neighbours, generally; C, war of Athens against Thebes, an event to come and under deliberation; D, war of Thebes against Phokis, a past event of which the issue is known to have been signally mischievous. You assume as known, first, that A is predicable of D, _i.e._ that the war of Thebes against Phokis has been disastrous; next, that B is predicable both of C and of D, _i.e._ that each of the two wars, of Athens against Thebes, and of Thebes against Phokis, is a war of neighbours against neighbours, or a conterminous war. Now from the premiss that A is predicable of D, along with the premiss that B is predicable of D, you infer that A is predicable of the class B, or of conterminous wars generally; and hence you draw the farther inference, that A is also predicable of C, another particular case under the same class B. The inference here is, in the first instance, from part to whole; and finally, through that whole, from the one part to another part of the same whole. _Induction_ includes in its major premiss all the particulars, declaring all of them to be severally subjects of the major as predicate; hence it infers as conclusion, that the major is also predicable of the middle or class-term comprising all these particulars, but comprising no others. _Example_ includes not all, but only one or a few particulars; inferring from it or them, first, to the entire class, next, to some new analogous particular belonging to the class.[58] [Footnote 57: Ibid. II. xxiv. p. 68, b. 38: [Greek: paradei=gma d' e)sti\n o(/tan tô=| me/sô| to\ a)/kron u(pa/rchon deichthê=| dia\ tou= o(moi/ou tô=| tri/tô|.]]