As this is a question of the gravest importance we all ought to know whether, as claimed twice in the arguments of defendant's counsel, the military commission which tried the conspirators and assassins has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to have been an illegal tribunal. Judge Pierrepont, as we have seen, asserts boldly that in his judgment no such decision had ever been given by that tribunal, or ever would be. That the counsel for the defense did not really so understand it he clearly shows by the fact that they had never asked for a writ of _habeas corpus_ in behalf of those who were working out the sentence of the commission. To his opinion I will now add that of Judge Fisher as given in his charge to the jury. It is as follows:-- "You have been told, gentlemen, in the argument of this case, that those who were tried before that military commission, and hung upon its findings, were themselves the victims of a base and disgraceful conspiracy to murder. Brave, gallant, and honest soldiers of their country have been held up before you as inhuman butchers of innocent men. It has been said in support of this denunciation, that the Supreme Court of the United States have, in the case of Milligan, declared that the military court which tried Herold and others for the murder of Abraham Lincoln was an illegal tribunal, organized without law, without right, and without warrant in the Constitution--a mere convocation of military men, having no right to try the cause committed to them by President Johnson; and it has been said that it was convoked not to try but to condemn. "In my humble judgment the Supreme Court has made no such decision. If so, why have not the prisoners now confined upon the Dry Tortugas for complicity in the greatest crime of the age been released from their confinement? They have sympathizing friends enough to have applied any such decision in the direction of their deliverance, and they would not have remained there a week after the decision had been made to the effect that they were unlawfully restrained of their liberty. If I understand the decision in Milligan's case aright, it went upon the ground that the commission which tried Milligan was not organized in obedience to the act of Congress providing for the punishment of such crimes as he was charged with committing, and the opinion of the majority of the court went upon the additional ground that no hostile foot had ever pressed the soil of Indiana at the time when he was arraigned before a military tribunal there, and that, therefore, that tribunal which condemned him for acts of treason committed in that State had no authority to try him, notwithstanding the whole nation was involved in the most terrible struggle for its life. The majority opinion being thus predicated upon a misapprehension of historic truth, we could not, perhaps, have looked for a more rightful deduction.