The soldier that would fail to try a spy or a bandit after his capture would be as derelict in duty as if he were to fail to capture; he is as much bound to try and execute, if guilty, as he is to arrest; the same law that makes it his duty to pursue and kill or capture makes it his duty to try according to the usages of war. The judge of a civil court is not more strongly bound, under the Constitution and the law, to try a criminal, than is the military to try an offender against the laws of war. The fact that the civil courts are open does not affect the right of the military tribunal to hold as a prisoner and to try. The civil courts have no more right to prevent the military, in time of war, from trying an offender against the laws of war than they have a right to interfere and prevent a battle. A battle may be lawfully fought in the very presence of the court; so a spy, a bandit, or other offender against the law of war, may be tried, and tried lawfully, when and where the civil courts are open and transacting business. The law of war authorizes human life to be taken without legal process; or that legal process contemplated by those provisions of the Constitution that are relied upon to show that military judicial tribunals are unconstitutional. Wars should be prosecuted justly as well as bravely. One enemy in the power of another, whether he be an open or a secret one, should not be punished or executed without a trial. If the question be one concerning the laws of war, he should be tried by those engaged in the war; they, and they only, are his peers. The military must decide whether he is, or is not, an active participant in hostilities. If he is an active participant in the hostilities it is the duty of the military to take him, without warrant or other judicial process, and dispose of him as the laws of war direct. It is curious to see one and the same mind justify the killing of thousands of men in battle because it is done according to the laws of war, and yet condemning that same law when, out of regard for justice, and with the hope of saving life, it orders a military trial before the enemy are killed. The love of law, of justice, and the wish to save life and suffering should impel all good men in time of war to uphold and sustain the existence and actions of such tribunals. The object of such tribunals is obviously intended to save life, and when their jurisdiction is confined to offenses against the laws of war, that is their effect. They prevent indiscriminate slaughter; they prevent men from being punished or killed on mere suspicion. The law of nations, which is the result of the wisdom and experience of ages, has decided that jayhawkers, banditti, etc., are offenders against the laws