The intentions of the Government in regard to the substitution of an elective executive, which have not yet been definitely formulated, may be gathered from a speech made by Dr. Cockburn, the principal advocate of the change, in which he proposed that Ministers, who would continue, as at present, to be Members of Parliament, should be elected by ballot by the Assembly at the commencement of each session; that they should appoint one of their number to be their leader, but should be responsible individually to Parliament for their respective departments; and that their corporate responsibility should be limited to matters affecting the Province as a whole, such as finance or its relations with other countries. The Governor's prerogative of dissolution would remain unaffected, but as the House would be brought into closer touch with the people, dissolutions would be unnecessary and undesirable. Dr. Cockburn claimed that his proposal was in accordance with the natural evolution of Parliamentary Government, and contended that, the area of selection being enlarged, the {27} best men would be chosen as Ministers from the whole House and the best man for each office. Ministers would not be called upon to justify proceedings of their colleagues which in their hearts they condemned, and private members would be able to exercise greater independence, as they would not be called upon to sacrifice their convictions to maintain their friends in office, and, being allowed greater freedom on questions of legislation, would introduce many bills of an important character. Intrigue, which was an essential of Party government, would become disreputable when resorted to for purposes of personal advancement. The objection that certain members would not work together if chosen to form an administration was met by the fact that men sat in amity on the Treasury benches who previously had denounced one another to the utmost of their power. The distinctive feature of the proposal, therefore, is the indirect election of Ministers. The people elect the representatives, who, in turn, are to elect certain of their number to form the Executive. The first criticism that suggests itself is, that it is difficult to believe in the rapid elimination of party feeling, and that it is probable, granted the existence of intrigues among aspirants for office under the present system, that they would be increased tenfold when such persons sought to ingratiate themselves, not only with prospective Premiers, but with a majority of the members of the Assembly. Again, {28} while it is impossible to foresee all the results of the change, it may be anticipated that some obvious advantages would be counterbalanced by incoherence of policy and haphazard legislation, but that a class of men might be induced to come forward as candidates who are deterred by their horror of continual party strife. Dr. Cockburn stated that no amendment would be required