great and that it was best to have his friendship; they loved especially to be invited to his dinners, and their families loved to be invited to his balls. He was a POWER. The question above referred to, of such importance to the United States, was not decided by argument, but simply by the weight of social and other influence, which counts so enormously in matters of this kind at all European capitals, and especially in Russia. This condition of things has since been modified by the change of the legation into an embassy; but, as no house has been provided, the old difficulty remains. The United States has not the least chance of success, and under her present shabby system never will have, in closely contested cases, with any of the great powers of the earth. They provide fitly for their representatives; the United States does not. The representatives of other powers, being thus provided for, are glad to remain at their posts and to devote themselves to getting a thorough mastery of everything connected with diplomatic business; American representatives, obliged, as a rule, to take up with uncomfortable quarters, finding their position not what it ought to be as compared with that of the representatives of other great powers, and obliged to expend much more than their salaries, are generally glad to resign after a brief term. Especially has this been the case in St. Petersburg. The terms of our representatives there have generally been very short. A few have stayed three or four years, but most have stayed much shorter terms. In one case a representative of the United States remained only three or four months, and in another only six weeks. So marked was this tendency that the Emperor once referred to it in a conversation with one of our representatives, saying that he hoped that this American diplomatist would remain longer than his predecessors had generally done. The action of the Russian authorities in the Behring Sea question, which is directly traceable to the superior policy of Great Britain in maintaining a preponderating diplomatic, political, and social influence at the Russian capital, cost our government a sum which would have bought suitable houses in several capitals, and would have given to each American representative a proper staff of assistants. I have presented this matter with reluctance, though I feel not the slightest responsibility for my part in it. I do not think that any right-minded man can blame me for it, any more than, in the recent South African War, he could have blamed Lord Roberts, the British general, if the latter had been sent to the Transvaal with insufficient means, inadequate equipment, and an army far inferior in numbers to that of his enemy.