Aviation in Peace and WarSykes, Frederick Hugh, Sir
History
Aviation in Peace and War
Sykes, Frederick Hugh, Sir
Aeronautics
"Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest
quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay,
or under pressure, or by the help of any kind of fuel which may be
supplied by the cauldron. It will be done only when the will or
spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength by
its own proper fuel, namely the affection."
I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time when,
as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in the
field. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon;
believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; and
determined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forces
of the Crown. _Esprit de Corps_ was of vital importance, but as officers
and non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and every
regiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved by
the splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke,
Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "Per
Ardua ad Astra." It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grew
in peace. It was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which later
under the great strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully to
face every duty and every danger in the true spirit of manliness and
fearless confidence.
As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it was
our aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, it
would be sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effected
without even temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of the
Military Wing--the squadron, consisting of three flights, each of four
machines with two in reserve--had the advantage that it was of
sufficient size to act independently, while it was not too unwieldy for
a single command. It was equally suitable for independent or
co-operative action, and the full complement of seven squadrons would,
in addition to a reserve, furnish one squadron for each division of an
Army Expeditionary force of the size then contemplated, though no
definite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower commands was at first
intended. The French and Germans, on the other hand, were building up
their organizations with smaller units, with the result that they found
even greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining sufficient
experienced officers to command them. It is probable that the consequent
lack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to sound
principles of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success of
the German air service in the opening phases of the war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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