“It is true,” I replied. “You can verify the fact in fifteen minutes. A few blocks from where we sit is a Carnegie Library in which you can find a volume containing various treaties of the United States. The Treaty of Ghent is among them. It is called the Treaty of Amity.” “May I ask who you are?” questioned the young man, with a changed and puzzled mien. “I am a member of the Committee appointed by the State to make research into the real value of the Battle of New Orleans.” “I am delighted to know you,” said the young man. “I love to discuss history, which reveals the foundation of our existing social structure. There are some questions I would like to ask of you. First, since the Treaty was eventually ratified, aren’t our historians while technically wrong, in saying the Battle of New Orleans occurred after Peace, and was a useless battle, really in the right, for the reason that the battle really had no effect upon the Peace Treaty?” “It is true,” I replied, “the Treaty adopted at Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, was ratified soon after its reception in Washington, and promulgated the next day, Feb. 18, 1815. That was after the news of the victory at New Orleans had reached Washington. “But suppose the result at New Orleans had been different, would President Madison have signed the Treaty? “That is a real question for college debate. It is a question calculated to bring sharply to the student the picture of the distracted condition of our country at the time. By signing the treaty Madison would have appeased the New England section, then in hostile and threatening attitude, but at the same time would have faced the surrender of the territory west of the Mississippi for all time, or faced future negotiation or war. By refusing to sign, the President would have prolonged the war with its uncertainties. At the same time he would have confronted possible disunion through the open disaffection of the northeastern states. The English government construed the disaffection as a threat of secession. “It was planned by that calculating government, as evidence shows, to inveigle New England into a separate treaty in case after British capture and occupation of New Orleans, Madison should refuse to ratify the Ghent treaty. Thus, if the issue in that New Orleans affair had been different, President Madison would have faced danger of disunion, on one side or the other. “It would be hard to conceive of a graver situation. All this was averted, and gloriously averted, by the victory at New Orleans, the news of which caused the treaty to be joyfully ratified.” “Haven’t you overdrawn the picture?” asked the young man. “Isn’t it a fact that the treaty provided for the return of all territory taken during the war, so that, if the English had captured New Orleans they would have given it up?”