"After having forced the enemy to flee to his entrenchments Caesar, persuaded that he ought not to give the slightest respite to a terrorized enemy, incited his soldiers to profit by their advantage and attack the camp. Although overcome by the heat, for the struggle was prolonged into the middle of the day, they did not object to greater fatigue and obeyed. The camp was at first well defended by the cohorts on watch and especially by the Thracians and barbarians. The men who had fled from the battle, full of fright and overcome with fatigue, had nearly all thrown their arms and colors away and thought rather more of saving themselves than of defending the camp. Even those who defended the entrenchments were unable long to resist the shower of arrows. Covered with wounds, they abandoned the place, and led by their centurions and tribunes, they took refuge as quickly as they could in the high mountains near the camp. "Caesar lost in this battle but two hundred soldiers, but nearly thirty of the bravest centurions were killed therein. Of Pompey's army fifteen thousand perished, and more than twenty-four thousand took refuge in the mountains. As Caesar had invested the mountains with entrenchments, they surrendered the following day." Such is Caesar's account. His action is so clearly shown that there is scarcely any need of comment. Initially Caesar's formation was in three lines. This was the usual battle order in the Roman armies, without being absolute, however, since Marius fought with two only. But, as we have said, according to the occasion, the genius of the chief decided the battle formation. There is no reason to suppose that Pompey's army was in a different order of battle. To face that army, twice as large as his, Caesar, if he had had to preserve the disposition of cohorts in ten ranks, would have been able to form but one complete line, the first, and a second, half as numerous, as a reserve. But he knew the bravery of his troops, and he knew the apparent force of deep ranks to be a delusion. He did not hesitate to diminish his depth in order to keep the formation and morale of three-fifths of his troops intact, until the moment of their engagement. In order to be even more sure of the third line of his reserve, and in order to make sure that it would not be carried away by its enthusiasm for action, he paid it most particular attention. Perhaps, the text is doubtful, he kept it at double the usual distance in rear of the fighting lines.