MR. LEON said he did not care whether there was a conflict of evidence on that point or not. He did not rely on that. In his opinion Mr. Coldham supported Mr. Reid’s statement, because he said in his affidavit that he called out to McGregor that he wanted to see him. The main feature of this affair was the agreement of all the deponents, and the admission by Mr. Coldham and Mr. Stewart that they were drinking with three jurymen in the bar of an hotel before the case had been concluded. He had not got to prove that there was actual impropriety, but there could be no doubt about the principle that even the appearance of wrong-doing must not be shown in the administration of justice. In the first place, it was a gross impropriety on the part of these three jurymen to drink and smoke and converse in a public bar with counsel and solicitor for one of the parties in a case being heard by them. It was very improper for counsel and solicitor to be seen with members of the jury in a public bar in the presence of people who knew that litigation was going on, and that the judges of the facts in that litigation and the advocates for one of the parties to that litigation were “hobnobbing” together. He had no hesitation in saying it was most indiscreet and improper, and if there was the appearance of impropriety in connection with the case the trial must be void. The public must feel satisfied and rest content in their minds that not even the shadow of suspicion could be cast on the administration of justice. That principle had been laid down by the Court, and such being so, this occurrence was such an impropriety as would vitiate the proceedings. It was admitted that the juryman McGregor was a friend of Mr. Coldham’s, and had passed him a paper relating to the case. MR. BOX: In open court. MR. LEON did not care whether it was in open court or not. It was a most improper thing to do. Communications had no right to be passed between the judge of the facts of the case and the advocates of one of the parties in the case. Nothing of that kind could be tolerated, because people would say, and be justified in saying, there was a very fine understanding between defendants’ counsel in the case and that juryman; that they seemed to be on excellent terms with each other. To allow such a thing to pass would be intolerable, and bring the administration of justice into contempt, The principle for which he contended had been laid down by Mr. Justice Hood in a considered judgment. MR. SCHUTT said that before the Court proceeded to deliver judgment on the first ground of appeal, he would like it to consider a point of law raised as a defence at the trial of the action in the lower Court, but not then argued, as the jury found in defendants’ favour. He believed the point was absolutely fatal to plaintiff’s case, and even if the Court were of opinion that a new trial should be granted, it would be useless in the face of this point to order a new trial to go on.