MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS said the Court would deliver judgment, and the point could be argued after. MR. JUSTICE A’BECKETT said he had the misfortune to differ from his learned brothers as to the course which should be taken with regard to this appeal. The ground on which he thought a new trial should not be ordered, was that beyond all question it would inflict a great hardship on the defendants, who had succeeded in the action, and who were in no way to blame for the indiscretion which had occurred. He thought the duty of the Court in dealing with litigation between the parties was to do justice between the plaintiff and defendants, and not to make an order subjecting to injustice one of those parties in vindication of a principle, unless it was absolutely necessary that they should proceed to that vindication; nor should they make it for the mere purpose of marking strongly their disapproval of that which had occurred. Viewing the case in that aspect, it appeared to be that they were not called upon to vindicate any principle, or to express their disapprobation of what had occurred (disapprobation that both sides admitted must be expressed), in a way which would produce the very serious results that would follow the granting of a new trial. What occurred was done openly, and, as Judge Chomley had said, it was the very last mode of approaching a jury improperly that any man in his sober senses—in his “glass of wine” senses—would attempt. The evidence did not show that there was the slightest attempt made to influence the jury, and when it was known what really occurred, he did not think the conduct would convey to a rational mind any cause for suspicion. The drinking of this glass of wine at the invitation of one of the jurymen was a matter which people might observe upon. They might say it did not look well to see counsel treated by that juryman. He thought that observation would be quite right; it was conduct which the Court would not sanction or countenance, and if the Court had called upon those engaged in this matter for an explanation, it would express its disapprobation and make them pay. But he did not think they should go beyond that, particularly as the judge who tried the case thought it was not a matter in which it would be right to order a new trial. Being convinced that the jury were not influenced, and that the fact that counsel and solicitor had accepted sixpennyworth of hospitality from one of the jurymen would not induce anyone to suppose they would be influenced, he thought this new trial should not be granted. The impropriety, such as it was, did not require such an expression of disapprobation by this Court as would be expressed by granting a new trial.