been an attempt to bias and influence the proper administration of justice, the Court, for the purpose of placing the administration of justice as far as possible above reasonable suspicion, would grant a new trial. Another case had been cited (Hughes _v._ Budds, 4 _Jurist_, p. 156), where some of the jury managed to get out of their room on more than one occasion while considering their verdict, and two of them went to an hotel, where they were seen drinking beer and eating bread and cheese in the company of the plaintiff’s attorney. The Court there held that these were acts of impropriety on the part of the jury sufficient to awaken a reasonable suspicion that the administration of justice had been tampered with. In the Victorian Court the same principle seemed to be observed, according to decisions by Mr. Justice Hood and the Chief Justice. He accepted every word of Mr. Coldham’s affidavit, and from the undisputed facts it was apparent that he knew the juryman (McGregor) before. This was all the more reason why he should have kept him at arm’s length. It appeared that McGregor handed Mr. Coldham a piece of paper just as the Court had adjourned. That fact alone would be calculated to excite suspicion. The learned counsel thoughtlessly and indiscreetly took this piece of paper, and looked at it, when his proper course would have been to hand it back at once, and say to the juryman, “You must not communicate with me.” This piece of paper contained, in the shape of a drawing, the juryman’s views on the construction of a portion of the vessel. That was an improper act. Mr. Coldham ran out into the street, and called out that it was of no use to him. Getting as a response “That’s all right,” he shouted out that he intended to take it down to him. Learned counsel could not remember whether he said “at Menzies’ Hotel,” but what was present in his mind was that he would bring it to the Menzies’. Therefore, he must have known the juryman was going there. He did meet the juryman there, and together with the defendants’ solicitor had a drink with him after handing the paper back. Such conduct on the part of both the counsel and the solicitor was highly indiscreet and highly imprudent, or, as Mr. Box admitted, “heedlessly indiscreet.” Coming back to the principle he had enunciated, what would these undisputed facts give rise to in the minds of the plaintiff and the public generally? They would naturally give rise to the suspicion that plaintiff’s case, so far as the administration of justice was concerned, was not receiving fair play. He would go further and say that the facts would reasonably give rise to the suspicion that there was some underhand work going on which was calculated to influence the jury in favour of the defendant. Upon that ground, and acting on the principle he had referred to, he thought there should be a new trial, and in coming to that conclusion he did not think it was in the slightest degree contrary to that on