We say, therefore, that the imminence of a French attack upon Belgium was only a pretext and a bugbear; a pretext to justify the violation of Belgium in the eyes of other nations; a bugbear to catch votes of credit in the Reichstag without previous discussion. "We were not able to wait for this session before commencing hostilities and invading Luxemburg, perhaps even Belgium," declared the Chancellor. Observe how clumsy is this "perhaps"; the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August (1st _Grey Book_, No. 35), and on the afternoon of the 4th, at the session of the Reichstag, the Chancellor had no knowledge of it! We thought the official telegraph service worked better than that in Germany! * * * * * What, then, were the real reasons for invading our country? They were strategic reasons, it is true, but not those which the Chancellor indicated in his speech! They had been known for a long time; the German staff had always regarded a sudden attack upon France as an unavoidable necessity, and for that it was necessary at all costs to cross Belgium. Moreover, on the very day when the Chancellor was still invoking the French preparations in the Reichstag, the Secretary of State, von Jagow, openly avowed the true motive for violating Belgium. The pamphlet of propaganda, _Die Wahrheit über den Krieg_, after invoking, without insisting on, the danger of a French attack, described at length the German plan of campaign; a sudden attack upon France, delivered by passing through Belgium; then, immediately after victory, a change of front, and the crushing of the Russian Army. The same idea is expounded in an infinity of articles and pamphlets. There can, therefore, be no remaining doubt as to the determining motives of Germany: she wished to pass through Belgium in order to fall upon France before the latter was ready. Germany had been preparing for war for several days, for she knew that she had made the war inevitable, while France, deceived by her adversary's peaceful professions of faith, and, moreover, anxious to preserve the peace, which she still believed to be possible, had hardly commenced her mobilization. Let us recall the comparison drawn by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech at the City Temple on the 11th November, 1914. "Imagine," he said, "that your right-hand neighbour came and made you the following proposal: 'See, my friend, I've got to cut the throat of your left-hand neighbour. Only as his door is barred I can't catch him unawares, and so I shall lose my advantage over him. So you will do me a little service; nothing that isn't entirely reasonable, as you will see. You will just let me come through your garden; if I trample down your borders a little I'll have them raked and put in good order again; and if by ill-luck I damage or kill one of your children I promise you a nice little indemnity.'"