manifested in ethical and political life, least of all to make men less rational, in the sense that they are to become mere creatures of Impulse. Nevertheless, Bergson's great emphasis on Will and Creativeness condemns any laissez-faire type of political theory. It would be wrong for us to accept the social order which is felt to be imperfect and unjust in so many ways, simply because we find ourselves in it and fear we cannot work a way out. WE HAVE GREAT POWER OF CREATION, AND IN LARGE MEASURE WE CAN CREATE WHAT WE WILL IN THE WORLD OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE, and it is good that men generally should be made to see this. But it is of very vital importance that we should will the right thing. This we are not likely to do impulsively and without reflection. Even if we admit Mr. Russell's contention that "impulse has more effect than conscious purpose in moulding men's lives" [Footnote: Principles of Social Reconstruction, Preface, p. 5.] and agree that "it is not the weakening of impulse that is to be desired, but the direction of impulse toward life and growth," [Footnote: p. 18. Cf. the whole of the first chapter on The Principle of Growth.] yet, we none the less assert that instinct is an insufficient guide in the determination of social behaviour, and ask how the direction of impulse, of which Mr. Russell himself speaks, is to be arrived at? Surely our only hope lies in striving to make men not less, but more rational in order that they may grasp--however dimly--something of what is implied in ethical and political ideals, that they may recognize in society some embodiment of will and purpose and come to look upon Thought and Reason as the unifying and organizing principles of human society. We cannot help wishing that Bergson had given us some contribution to the study of Ethics. In one of his letters to Father de Tonquedec regarding the relation of his philosophy to Theology, we find him remarking that "Before these conclusions [theological statements] can be set out with greater precision, or considered at greater length, certain problems of quite another kind would have to be attacked--the problems of Ethics. I am not sure that I shall ever publish anything on this subject. I shall do so only if I attain the results that appear to me as demonstrable or as clearly to be shown as those of my other books." [Footnote: In Etudes (Revue des Peres de Jesus), Vol. CXXX, pp. 514, 515, 1912.] Prior to the War, however, we know that Bergson was taking up the problem of working out the implications of his philosophy in the sphere of social ethics, with particular reference to the meaning of "Duty" and the significance of "Personality." Although his investigations of these supremely important problems have not yet been completed or made public, nevertheless certain ethical implications which have an important bearing on personal and social life seem to be contained in what he has already written.