In the meantime I had a further interview with the Chief. On the forenoon of the 27th of February I received a letter from his Secretary, Sachse, saying that the Prince requested me to call upon him, if possible, some time before 5 o’clock. At 3 P.M. I went to his palace. After waiting in the antechamber for a quarter of an hour, a slight, thin elderly gentleman came out, being accompanied by the Prince as far as the antechamber. This was Lord Dufferin, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg. I then went with the Prince into his study, where we sat down facing each other across his writing-table as usual. “You recently told me,” he began, “that when I had anything to say you could get it into the _Grenzboten_.” I replied: “Certainly, Serene Highness; it shall be done without delay.” “Well, then, I would beg of you to write something on the policy which Gortschakoff is promoting in the Russian press, and particularly in the _Golos_, and to draw a comparison between what we have done for the Russians and what they have done for us. It must, however, be written with tact, in a diplomatic way.” “I will try to do so,” I replied. “I am acquainted with the articles in the _Golos_ through the German _Petersburger Zeitung_. It shall be done at once, as was the article on the subject of our last conversation. With your permission, I will send you a proof of it to-morrow, in case you should wish to add or strike out anything.” “Please do so,” he said. “And now as to Gortschakoff. You know how the _Golos_ incessantly attacks our policy and me personally, asserts that we were ungrateful at the Berlin Congress, and recommends joint action with France. That is the work of Gortschakoff and Jomini, and this fact must be got into our press. Gortschakoff must be shown what we have owed or have not owed to Russia during the past fifty or sixty years, and what we have done for her in this period. Russia helped us in 1813, but in her own interest. In 1815, the Russian’s policy was in a general way a good one, but at the same time it injured us by frustrating any organisation of Germany which might not have fitted in with the Emperor Alexander’s plans for rearranging the world; our demand for compensation also received but very lukewarm support from the Russians. Finally, their gains were greater than ours, although we had risked and achieved more, and made greater sacrifices than they had done. You know that in 1828 we did them good service during the Turkish war by Muffling’s mission for example, which helped them out of a great embarrassment. In 1830, they wanted to attack us in co-operation with France, for whom we were anxious to secure the left bank of the Rhine. The execution of this plan was only prevented by the outbreak of the July Revolution. Shortly before the February Revolution a similar plan was being developed. In 1847 we suppressed the rising in Posen in the interest of Russia. During the first war with Denmark they ran counter to us.