to the absurd policy which Professor Gladstone has pursued from the beginning. He tries to come to an understanding with France and Russia, forgetting the fact that their interests in the Levant are quite different to those of the English. He surrendered all the valuable results which English policy had tried to secure during the past eighty years in its dealings with the Porte and with Austria, and thought he could work miracles when he had offended them both. And in France they have also taken a wrong course out of consideration for public opinion. Egypt is of the utmost importance to England on account of the Suez Canal, the shortest line of communication between the eastern and western halves of the Empire. That is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain. Any increase of Turkish power does not affect England injuriously in this, or indeed in any other respect. France thinks more of the prestige to be gained by the Porte if it exercises a mediating and controlling influence in the Egyptian question, and fears that her own prestige in Africa might suffer. Nevertheless, France has also very important material interests there, since there are 14,000 Frenchmen in Egypt and only 3,000 English. It was in vain for me to point out to them that an Arabian Empire, such as Arabi may have in view, would be far more dangerous to their position in Africa than any strengthening of Turkish influence on the Nile. The Porte is an old European landowner who is deeply in debt, and who can always be reached and subjected to pressure if he becomes too exacting. It is impossible to foresee what effect an independent Egypt would have upon the French position in Africa. That is doubtless recognised by Freycinet, but he is afraid of the traditions, prejudices and vanity of the French, and of Gambetta, who manipulates them. It is true the division in the Chamber turned out favourably, indeed very much so, but even assuming that Gambetta cannot return to power shortly, the wind may soon blow from another quarter, and the understanding with England come to an end. A campaign in co-operation with the French, a military occupation, would be a hazardous undertaking for the English, as the French could always send more men than they, who require their soldiers in Ireland, and who have altogether none too many. If France had the larger force there she would of course exercise more influence and play the leading part, and it would perhaps be difficult to get her out of the country again. The rest of us would not co-operate in a military sense, as for the present the question is one of comparative indifference to us, and it is no business of ours to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for other people, particularly for the English. So there they are, with their ships, in a blind alley, and now they want a conference to put the matter right. Here also we are expected to come to their assistance,